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The derivation of scalar implicatures for the quantifier some has been widely studied
to investigate the computation of pragmatically enriched meanings. For example, the
sentence “I found some books” carries the semantic interpretation that at least one
book was found, but its interpretation is often enriched to include the implicature that
not all the books were found. The implicature is argued to be more likely to arise when
it is relevant for addressing a question under discussion (QUD) in the context, e.g.,
when “I found some books” is uttered in response to “Did you find all the books?”
as opposed to “Did you find any books?”. However, most experimental studies have
not examined the influence of context on some, instead testing some sentences in
isolation. Moreover, no study to our knowledge has examined individual differences
in the ability to utilize context in interpreting some, whereas individual variation in
deriving implicatures for some sentences in isolation is widely attested, with alternative
proposals attributing this variation to individual differences in cognitive resources (e.g.,
working memory) or personality-based pragmatic abilities (e.g., as assessed by the
Autism-Spectrum Quotient). The current study examined how context influences the
interpretation of some in a story-sentence matching task, where participants rated
some statements (“I cut some steaks”) uttered by one character, in response to another
character’s question (QUD) that established the implicature as relevant (“Did you cut
all the steaks?”) or irrelevant (“Did you cut any steaks?”). We also examined to what
extent individuals’ sensitivity to QUD is modulated by individual differences via a battery
of measures assessing cognitive resources, personality-based pragmatic abilities, and
language abilities (which have been argued to modulate comprehension in other
domains). Our results demonstrate that QUD affects the interpretation of some, and
reveal that individual differences in sensitivity to QUD are modulated by both cognitive
resources and personality-based pragmatic abilities. While previous studies have argued
alternatively for cognitive resources or personality-based pragmatic abilities as important
for deriving implicatures for some in isolation, we argue that arriving at a context-
sensitive interpretation for some depends on both cognitive and personality-based
properties of the individual.
Keywords: scalar implicature, question under discussion (QUD), individual differences, working memory,
attentional control, Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), pragmatic abilities
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INTRODUCTION
In conversational exchanges, interlocutors commonly convey
meanings which go beyond the literal semantic content of the
utterance and require the generation of pragmatic inferences on
the part of the comprehender. A widely researched phenomenon
which is argued to involve pragmatic inferencing is the
interpretation of the quantifier some. For instance, the utterance
in (1) semantically entails that at least one, and possibly all of the
students is hardworking, yet pragmatically the interpretation is
often enriched with the implicature that not all of the students are
hardworking (Noveck and Sperber, 2007; Katsos and Cummins,
2010).
(1) Some of the students are hardworking.
Semantic entailment: At least one, and possibly all of the
students is hardworking.
Pragmatic implicature: Not all the students are
hardworking.
The two readings differ in whether all is negated, since the
semantic reading does not exclude the possibility that all may
hold. In addition, the pragmatic implicature differs from the
inherent semantic meaning, in that not all is cancellable but the
semantic entailment at least one is not (Grice, 1989; see also
Geurts, 2010), as shown in example (2) below:
(2) Non-cancellable semantic entailment:
Some of the students are hardworking. #In fact, none of them
are.
Cancellable pragmatic implicature:
Some of the students are hardworking. In fact, all of them are.
It has been argued that some is on a scale of quantifiers varying
in informativity (i.e., how specific a quantifier is), ranging from
the least to the most informative, e.g., <some, many, all> (Horn,
1972). Scalar implicature thus refers to the common intuition that
a less informative item implies the negation of a more informative
item on the scale, with some taken to imply not all. This
meaning is often argued to arise due to interlocutors’ expectation
that utterances shall be optimally informative, as formalized by
Gricean maxims (Grice, 1989); thus, the comprehender can infer
that the speaker must mean that the more informative term all
does not apply if they opted to use the less informative term some.
It is important to point out, however, that some is not
interpreted with the not all implicature in all cases. For example,
linguistic analyses of some highlight that the likelihood of
interpreting some with the implicature is heavily influenced by
the broader context in which the some sentence appears (Roberts,
2004; see also Chierchia et al., 2012). One specific context-
level factor that has been argued to play an important role in
determining whether some is interpreted with the implicature is
the question under discussion (QUD). QUD refers to the crucial
issue in the discourse that is expected to be addressed by a
relevant answer. The extent to which the not all implicature is
realized in the interpretation of some is argued to depend on
whether it is relevant under the current QUD (Roberts, 2004,
2012). Consider the following conversational exchanges, where
the some utterances made by Speaker B in (3) and (4) are in
response to different questions asked by Speaker A (examples
adapted from Levinson, 2000; Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino,
2013):
(3) Upper-bound QUD
Speaker A: “Are all the students in this lab hardworking?”
Speaker B: “Some of them are.”
(4) Lower-bound QUD
Speaker A: “Is there any evidence against them?”
Speaker B: “Some of their documents are forgeries.”
The reading that not all the students are hardworking strongly
arises in B’s reply in (3). However, B’s reply in (4) can be
felicitously interpreted without the not all implicature, as at least
one and possibly all of their documents was a forgery. This is due
to the difference in QUD in the two conversations, established
by A’s questions. The QUD in (3) involves all the students, thus
some in the reply should address A’s question and consequently
be interpreted with the not all implicature. Conversely, the QUD
in (4) involves whether there is at least one piece of evidence;
thus some can be simply interpreted as at least one without the
not all implicature, as all is irrelevant under A’s question. A QUD
that highlights all and thus encourages the not all implicature is
often termed as upper-bound (as in 3), while a QUD that does not
encourage the implicature is termed as lower-bound (as in 4).
As is illustrated in examples (3) and (4) above, the QUD is
often established in discourse through the linguistic utterances
of the interlocutors in a conversation. These utterances may
establish an issue that needs to be addressed, and thus indicate
what is expected from an appropriate answer in the current
discourse. In examples (3) and (4) above, for example, Speaker
A establishes a QUD through a linguistic utterance whose
properties (e.g., the choice of “all” versus “any”) set the stage
for interpreting subsequent utterances containing some with or
without the implicature. Thus, even though an answer sentence
with some may be ambiguous by itself, contextual cues such as
QUD are often provided by interlocutors which can be used to
disambiguate the optimal reading of some in the discourse.
We would like to note that there are a range of theories
that aim to account for how the not all implicature is
generated, ranging from those positing the implicature is only
generated when relevant (e.g., Relevance Theory approaches;
Sperber and Wilson, 2002), to those in which the implicature
is always generated, but may be canceled when not relevant
(e.g., the Default view; Levinson, 2000), as well as views in
which the not all interpretation is due to the presence/absence
of a silent exhaustive focus operator (e.g., the Grammatical
view; Chierchia, 2004; Chierchia et al., 2012) rather than to
pragmatic inferencing. While these approaches differ with respect
to the specific mechanism by which the not all meaning
comes into consideration as part of the interpretation of some,
they share the common assumption that context is important
in determining whether some is ultimately interpreted with
this meaning1. However, despite the crucial role of context
1For example, under the Default view (Levinson, 2000), the implicature can be
canceled when it is irrelevant in the context, while under Relevance Theory
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highlighted in linguistic analyses of scalar implicature, only
a handful of experimental studies have examined the extent
to which comprehenders are indeed sensitive to context in
interpreting some, with the majority of the literature instead
testing some sentences in isolation, as we discuss below. Thus, the
primary aim of the current study is to determine experimentally
the extent to which comprehenders are sensitive to contextual
information such as QUD and to characterize and account for
the variability that individuals may show in sensitivity to context
in interpreting some.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON SCALAR
IMPLICATURE
Studies on scalar implicature that do not manipulate context
often test some sentences that are underinformative. These
sentences are semantically true but pragmatically infelicitous
based on, for example, world knowledge, such as the sentence in
(5a) (examples from Noveck and Posada, 2003).
(5a) Underinformative: Some dogs have paws.
(5b) True and informative: Some people have pets.
In (5a), if some is interpreted as some but not all, the sentence
is pragmatically infelicitous, as it would be more informative to
use all instead (since all dogs have paws), although the sentence
is semantically true (at least one dog has paws). Underinformative
sentences can thus be used to test whether or not a scalar
implicature has been generated: if the not all implicature is
realized, the infelicity should lead to increased rates of rejection
as compared to true and informative sentences such as (5b),
in judgment tasks, and to evidence of processing disruption in
online studies. Using this paradigm, studies have found that
adult native speakers, when analyzed as a group, generally show
sensitivity to pragmatic infelicity (e.g., Noveck and Posada, 2003;
Bott and Noveck, 2004; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; Huang and
Snedeker, 2009; Hunt et al., 2013; Tomlinson et al., 2013).
However, one major drawback in studies establishing
underinformativity based on world knowledge (as in example
5a) is that they require that participants draw on their world
knowledge and verify if counterexamples exist to evaluate the
sentences (e.g., dogs that have no paws). Judgments may thus
depend on participants’ ability to consult the relevant world
knowledge, and may vary based on participants’ beliefs about how
typical the world under discussion is when they are presented
with these odd utterances (see Degen et al., 2015). Another
drawback is that effects of underinformativity can be confounded
with lexical differences across conditions. Notice that (5a) for
view (Sperber and Wilson, 2002), context may affect whether the implicature is
generated in the first place (see also the constraint-based account recently proposed
by Degen and Tanenhaus, 2015). Under the Grammatical view (Chierchia, 2004),
one may argue that context determines whether the silent operator is present
or not. As such, the context manipulation in the current study is not intended
to adjudicate among these alternative accounts of scalar implicature derivation,
but instead to examine to what extent comprehenders are indeed sensitive to
contextual information when interpreting some, and to probe the extent and
origins of individual differences in sensitivity to context in the interpretation of
some.
example contains the lexical items dogs and paws, while (5b)
contains people and pets (see, e.g., Nieuwland et al., 2010
for discussion regarding this concern). Issues regarding world
knowledge do not arise in variants of the underinformativity
approach that provide the information needed to determine the
felicity of the some sentences. This is often done by presenting
a visual display with a number of objects and then asking
participants to evaluate a some sentence about these objects
(e.g., Huang and Snedeker, 2009; Hunt et al., 2013; Antoniou
et al., 2016; among others). However, a general limitation of
studies testing some sentences presented in isolation is that
they do not directly target the comprehension of some within
a broader context that provides information indicating whether
the implicature is relevant, which might better approximate how
comprehenders typically must interpret some sentences during
everyday language use.
Another finding from this line of research on some in isolation
is that individual native speakers have been shown to vary
greatly from one another in terms of whether the not all
implicature is derived. Many studies have revealed that native
speakers generally fall into two groups: one group of speakers
that consistently rejects underinformative sentences, suggesting
that they interpret some pragmatically, and another group
that consistently accepts underinformative sentences, suggesting
that they interpret some semantically, without realizing the
implicature (Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott and Noveck, 2004;
Hunt et al., 2013; Heyman and Schaeken, 2015; Antoniou et al.,
2016). In a picture-sentence verification study on some by Hunt
et al. (2013), for example, among the 24 adult native speakers
of English tested, 11 rejected over 80% of the underinformative
sentences, while 10 accepted over 80% of the underinformative
sentences and only 3 showed no strong preference. Researchers
have begun to investigate what underlies this individual variation,
examining which properties of the individual may modulate the
extent to which they are likely to derive scalar implicatures during
the processing of some in isolation (e.g., Nieuwland et al., 2010;
Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty and Chemla, 2013; Tomlinson et al.,
2013; Heyman and Schaeken, 2015; Antoniou et al., 2016). We
review this literature in Section “Two Accounts for Individual
Differences in Scalar Implicature” below.
A handful of studies have investigated the effect of context
on the comprehension of some by manipulating QUD within
a discourse (e.g., Breheny et al., 2006; Zondervan et al., 2008;
Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino, 2013; Degen and Goodman, 2014;
Dupuy et al., 2016; Politzer-Ahles and Husband, 2018). In a
recent study on scalar implicature in French by Dupuy et al.
(2016), participants were presented with visual stories in which a
character acted upon all objects (e.g., a boy hiding five out of five
car toys), and a question-answer dialog about the story between
two puppets (Dupuy et al., 2016, experiment 3). The first puppet’s
question was either “Did the boy hide all the cars?” or “Did the
boy hide cars?”, representing either an upper-bound QUD or a
lower-bound QUD, to which the second puppet answered, “The
boy has hidden some cars.” Participants were asked to judge if
the second puppet’s answer was right by selecting “yes” or “no.”
Dupuy et al. (2016) found that participants were more likely
to select “no” under the upper-bound QUD compared to the
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lower-bound QUD, suggesting that contextual information such
as QUD does influence the comprehension of some. Although
these studies have yielded evidence for the influence of context,
none of them has systematically addressed individual differences.
This leaves open the question of to what extent individuals differ
in comprehending some utterances as dictated by the demands of
context, and what abilities may make one better able to compute
context-dependent interpretations for some. We address this
question in the current study.
Two Accounts for Individual Differences
in Scalar Implicature
As discussed by Antoniou et al. (2016), the literature has
yielded two main accounts which offer qualitatively different
explanations for the individual variation observed in the
comprehension of some: the “personality-based” account and the
“cognitive resources” account.
The personality-based account posits that an individual’s
likelihood of interpreting some with the not all implicature
depends on personality traits, such as one’s awareness of the
pragmatic use of language in everyday life (Nieuwland et al.,
2010; Katsos and Bishop, 2011; Feeney and Bonnefon, 2013).
Nieuwland et al. (2010), for example, examined the relationship
between unimpaired adult individuals’ interpretation of some
and their scores on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001), a questionnaire assessing individuals’ autistic
traits in a range of domains, including the everyday use of
language in social communication (the Communication subscale
of the AQ, “AQ-Comm subscale”). To examine individuals’
derivation of scalar implicatures, they compared brain responses
to the object word in underinformative sentences (e.g., lungs in
6a) and in true and felicitous control sentences (e.g., pets in 6b).
(6a) Underinformative: Some people have lungs, which
require good care.
(6b) True and informative: Some people have pets, which
require good care.
Nieuwland et al. (2010) found a larger N400 EEG response
for the object in underinformative sentences (6a) as compared to
the control sentences (6b). However, this effect was limited to a
subgroup of participants with better sensitivity to the pragmatic
use of language in social communication as measured by AQ-
Comm. In contrast, a subgroup with less sensitivity to the
pragmatic use of language in social communication showed an
effect in the opposite direction. Nieuwland et al. (2010) thus
suggested that the ability to realize the not all implicature online
depends on an individual’s awareness of the pragmatic aspects
of language use in everyday life (see also Feeney and Bonnefon,
2013 for similar findings regarding the relation between self-
perceived honesty and the scalar item or). However, the effects of
personality-based factors have not been consistently found across
studies; for example, Heyman and Schaeken (2015) did not find
a robust relation between the interpretation of some and their
personality-based measures, which included AQ and the Big-Five
Personality Test, thus leaving open the question of to what extent
personality traits modulate scalar implicature derivation.
In contrast to the personality-based account, the cognitive
resources account proposes that variation in cognitive resources
may affect the extent to which an individual is able to interpret
some with the not all implicature. Scalar implicature has been
characterized by some researchers as a costly process potentially
involving multiple processing steps (De Neys and Schaeken, 2007;
Huang and Snedeker, 2009; Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty and
Chemla, 2013; Tomlinson et al., 2013; see also Barbet and Thierry,
2016). For example, the generation of implicatures itself may
be costly, which is particularly emphasized in psycholinguistic
accounts of scalar implicature that reference processing cost in
arguing that implicatures may be generated only when relevant
to the context rather than by default. The interpretation of
some also arguably involves processes such as the encoding and
maintenance of information, including information regarding
the context and the interlocutors in the context, in order to
determine whether the interpretation of some is more optimal
with or without the implicature. It may also require switching
between generated interpretations of some that do or do not have
implicature (or, under the Grammatical view, representations
that do or do not include a silent operator), all of which may
rely on an individual’s cognitive resources such as working
memory and attentional control (see also Antoniou et al., 2016
for a recent discussion of how cognitive resources may come
into play under alternative conceptions of how implicatures are
generated).
Studies examining the influence of cognitive resources have
typically adopted dual-task paradigms where participants
respond to underinformative some statements while
simultaneously attending to a secondary task to which cognitive
resources must be allocated (De Neys and Schaeken, 2007;
Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty and Chemla, 2013; Heyman and
Schaeken, 2015). Other studies have included independent
measures of individuals’ cognitive abilities in order to test
the relationship between these cognitive resources and
the processing of some sentences (Antoniou et al., 2016).
For example, Dieussaert et al. (2011) elicited participants’
true/false judgments for underinformative some sentences while
simultaneously memorizing dot patterns. Participants were
asked to first memorize a dot pattern. Next, they judged an
underinformative some sentence. Finally, they were prompted
to reproduce the dot pattern. Differing in complexity, the dot
patterns were intended to engender either a high cognitive
load or a low cognitive load. Individual participants’ working
memory capacity was also assessed via the Operation Span Task.
Dieussaert et al. (2011) found that participants were overall
more likely to accept underinformative sentences when they
tried to memorize high-load patterns than low-load patterns.
This effect was only observed among the participants with low
working memory capacity, while those with higher working
memory capacity showed similar judgments regardless of high
or low cognitive load. Dieussaert et al. (2011) thus suggested
that realizing the not all implicature requires sufficient cognitive
resources.
While the literature on scalar implicature has typically focused
either on cognitive resources or on personality traits, to our
knowledge there have only been a few studies on the derivation of
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scalar implicature for some that examined the role of both types of
factor in the same study (Heyman and Schaeken, 2015; Antoniou
et al., 2016; for an examination of scalar terms other than
quantifiers, see Husband, 2014). Heyman and Schaeken (2015)
examined the effect of a range of factors, including cognitive
abilities and personality traits, on Dutch speakers’ judgments for
underinformative statements based on world knowledge, such
as Some oaks are trees. They found that neither cognitive nor
personality-based factors robustly predicted individual variation
in speakers’ judgments.
However, a recent study by Antoniou et al. (2016) revisited
this issue, testing the effects of both types of individual
differences on the interpretation of underinformative some
sentences when underinformativity was established within the
experiment, rather than based on world knowledge. In a
picture-sentence verification task, participants were asked to
judge underinformative statements like “There are hearts on
some of the cards” as true or false, based on a visual
display showing hearts on all five cards. Participants were
also assessed on a battery of measures targeting cognitive
resources and personality-based factors, including working
memory (Backward Digit Span Task and Reading Span Task),
attentional control (Stroop Task and the Simon task), cognitive
flexibility (the Number-letter Task), autistic traits (Autism-
Spectrum Quotient), personality traits (Big Five Inventory and
Honesty/Integrity/Authenticity scale), and verbal and non-verbal
IQ. Antoniou et al. (2016) found that interpreting some with
the not all implicature was robustly predicted by working
memory and age; individuals with larger working memory
capacity were more likely to consistently derive the implicature
(rejecting at least 4 out of 6 underinformative sentences
in their study) than those with smaller working memory
capacity, as were younger individuals. Other individual difference
measures, including those assessing autistic and personality
traits (e.g., Autism-Spectrum Quotient, Big-Five Inventory, and
Honesty/Integrity/Authenticity Scale), did not turn out to be
significant predictors. Antoniou et al. (2016) interpret the
results as lending support for the cognitive resources account.
They posit that the processes involved in computing scalar
implicature may demand sufficient working memory, but also
note that their stimuli, which included a high proportion of
unambiguous fillers (e.g., when the picture shows 3/5 cards
with stars), could also place a burden on working memory
resources and thus hinder implicature generation. Regarding
their finding that personality-based factors did not modulate
scalar implicature derivation, Antoniou et al. (2016) suggest that
personality-based factors might not account for variability in
interpreting some robustly when working memory is included
in the analysis, which previous studies like Nieuwland et al.
(2010) did not test. However, they also discuss the possibility that
personality-based factors may be more important for interpreting
some sentences in richer discourse contexts. They speculate
that, when tested in more naturalistic/communicative discourse
contexts, it is possible that both cognitive and personality-based
factors may modulate an individual’s likelihood of deriving the
implicature for some (see Marty and Chemla, 2013 for similar
discussion).
CURRENT STUDY
In the current study, we examine the role of individual
differences in the derivation of scalar implicatures for some
when presented in a communicative discourse context involving
two interlocutors. Our primary aim is to directly test whether
individual differences in scalar implicature derivation for some
in context are better accounted for by cognitive resources or by
personality-based pragmatic abilities, or whether both cognitive
and personality-based abilities may play a role, as speculated
by Antoniou et al. (2016). We address the following two main
research questions in this study: First, we examine whether
individuals’ interpretation of some is influenced by the QUD,
which is established via a brief discourse context involving
utterances by two interlocutors. If comprehenders are able to
utilize QUD in interpreting some in context, then the not all
implicature should be more likely to arise when the QUD
makes it relevant (upper-bound) than when the QUD does not
(lower-bound). Second, we examine which properties of the
individual modulate one’s ability to interpret some based on the
QUD, by including a battery of measures targeting abilities that
are potentially important for computing a context-dependent
interpretation of some, including measures targeting both
cognitive resources and personality-based pragmatic abilities.
We test the prediction that not only cognitive resources but
also personality-based pragmatic abilities may affect individuals’
ability to utilize QUD in interpreting some, given that the current
study examines scalar implicature derivation in a discourse
context involving communication between two interlocutors. As
we discuss below, we also include assessments of individuals’
language abilities to address to what extent language abilities
may account for variation in scalar implicature derivation in
context.
To address these questions, we tested participants using a
story-sentence matching task in which one character utters
a sentence containing some, such as “I folded some of the
sweaters,” following a question from another character that either
establishes the relevance of the not all implicature (e.g., “Did
you fold all the sweaters?”) or that the implicature is irrelevant
(e.g., “Did you fold any sweaters?)”. How many objects were
acted upon is illustrated in a visual display (showing, e.g., either
0, 2, or 4 folded sweaters). If an individual is sensitive to the
context (whether the implicature has been established as relevant
or as irrelevant), then they should be less likely to accept the
target sentence (e.g., “I folded some of the sweaters,” when 4 of
4 sweaters had been folded) when the implicature is relevant than
when it is irrelevant.
Participants also completed a battery of individual differences
assessments targeting cognitive resources and personality-based
pragmatic abilities, allowing us to directly test proposals that
individual differences in scalar implicature derivation have
their origin in either cognitive resources or personality-based
pragmatic abilities, or instead may make recourse to both
types of ability. In addition to examining these two commonly
tested potential sources of variation (cognitive resources and
personality traits), we also examine individual differences
in language skills as a third possible source of variability.
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Relationships between language skills and pragmatic abilities
have been explored in studies in the literature on children
(e.g., Katsos et al., 2011) and on adults with Autism and
Asperger Syndrome (e.g., Pijnacker et al., 2009). Yet in studies
examining unimpaired adults, language skills have rarely been
tested in the scalar implicature literature as a possible source
of individual variability. Therefore, the current study included
language skills as a third measure of individual differences, in
order to examine whether language skills may be among the
sources of variability contributing to individual differences in
scalar implicature derivation among unimpaired adult native
speakers.
Participants
Sixty-four native English speakers (19 male, mean age = 21.9, age
range = 18–53) who were naïve about the purpose of the study
were recruited from the University of Kansas community. All
participants provided informed consent before participating and
received a cash payment or course credit upon completing their
visit.
Main Task: Story-Sentence Matching
Task
The current study utilized a story-sentence matching task to
probe the interpretation of some in a context in which the
interpretation of the target some sentences depends on the QUD.
We constructed 32 target trials, each of which consisted of a
short story presented in text and pictures on a series of slides,
about two characters carrying out an action involving a set of
four objects (e.g., cutting four pieces of steak). The first slide
introduced the characters and the objects. The second slide
always showed that 4/4 objects were changed (e.g., all four steaks
were shown as cut); following Hunt et al. (2013), all acted-upon
objects were also highlighted by a red square to remove any
ambiguity regarding the number of objects acted-upon, and the
text showed that the objects ended up as shown in the picture
(e.g., “In the end, the steaks look like this.”). On the third slide,
a brief conversation between the characters was presented, in
which one character asked, “Have you cut all the steaks?” or
“Have you cut any steaks?” and the other responded “I cut some
steaks.” Then a rating question appeared, asking the participant
to rate how well the response matched with what happened in
the story on a 7-point Likert scale. After they responded by
clicking on their chosen rating on the scale, a button showing
“click here for the next story” appeared at the bottom center of
the screen, which triggered the next story once clicked on (see
Figure 1 for the depiction of an example trial). The slides were
automatically presented at a comfortable reading speed (first slide
8000 ms, second slide 3000 ms, third slide 4000 ms), and the
rating question and the scale were untimed. Participants were
asked to read the stories carefully and answer the question at the
end of each story.
In the target trials, we established an upper-bound or lower-
bound QUD by including “all” or “any” in the first character’s
question sentence, following Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino
(2013). When the question includes “all,” as in “Have you cut
all the steaks?”, the QUD is established as upper-bound, as
the character is asking about whether each and every steak in
the set has been cut. Therefore, the response sentence with
some is expected to be interpreted as at least one but not all,
such that the added not all implicature addresses the upper-
bound QUD. The response should thus be underinformative
since all four objects were acted upon as shown by the
picture. In contrast, when the question includes “any,” as in
“Have you cut any steaks?”, the QUD is established as lower-
bound, as the character is asking about whether at least one
steak has been cut. In this scenario, some is expected to be
interpreted as at least one without the not all implicature.
Thus, the response sentence with some should be felicitous
given that at least one object has been acted upon. Therefore,
if comprehenders are sensitive to the QUD in interpreting
some, they should rate the target some sentences lower when
the question sentence includes “all” (the upper-bound QUD;
all condition, henceforth), compared to when the question
sentence includes “any” (the lower-bound QUD; any condition,
henceforth).
In order to mask the purpose of the study and to
elicit participants’ interpretation of some in unambiguously
true/felicitous or false sentences, we also included 32 filler trials
that have the same story structure, presentation format, and
QUD manipulation as the target trials. However, the filler trials
differed from the target trials in two ways: (1) the character’s
answer sentence included only some instead of some (e.g., “I cut
only some steaks”), which should be unambiguously interpreted
as some but not all; and (2) the number of acted-upon objects
in the picture was 0/4, 2/4 or 4/4, while there were always 4/4
acted-upon objects in the target trials. These configurations thus
made the filler trials patently true or patently false depending
on the number of acted-upon objects, regardless of the QUD
being upper-bound or lower-bound; the fillers were true when 2/4
objects were acted upon, and false when either 0/4 or 4/4 objects
were acted upon.
From the two target conditions (all condition and any
condition), we generated two lists of targets by alternating the
QUD for each story, such that each participant would see
all 32 target stories, but no participant would encounter the
same story in both conditions. Each list included a total of
64 unique stories presented in random order (32 targets and
32 fillers), with half of the targets (16) in the all condition
and the other half (16) in the any condition. Participants were
randomly assigned to complete only one list. The truth value
of the response sentences, number of acted-upon objects, and
the QUD were balanced across all the trials (see Supplementary
Table S1, for a summary of the properties of the target and filler
stimuli).
Measures of Individual Differences
The current study examined three potential sources of individual
variation as discussed above (cognitive resources, personality-
based socio-pragmatic abilities, and language skills), testing
participants on a battery of measures targeting these three
domains. In the following section, we describe how these sources
of variations were assessed.
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FIGURE 1 | Sample display of a target trial in the main story-sentence matching task. Each trial is depicted on four consecutive slides, numbered 1–4 here.
Measures of Cognitive Resources
Working memory capacity: count span task
Working memory capacity has been widely suggested as a factor
that may account for individual differences in deriving scalar
implicatures (De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et al.,
2011; Marty and Chemla, 2013). When interpreting some under
a specific QUD in the discourse, as is required in the current
study, sufficient working memory may also be required to encode
and maintain the QUD throughout the task, and to accurately
represent what happens in an event which spans across multiple
sentences and visual representations of the story scene. Thus,
interpreting some in context and making distinctions between
QUDs may require sufficient working memory capacity.
In the current study, we assessed individual working
memory capacity via Count Span (Conway et al., 2005), which
measures non-verbal working memory in a counting and
recalling task. In the Count Span task, the participant was
asked to count out loud the number of appearances of a
specific shape when they viewed an array of shapes on the
computer screen. The experimenter recorded the numbers that
the participant had counted on each screen, after which a
screen with a new array of shapes appeared. After between
2 and 6 screens, the participant would be prompted to recall
the numbers they counted on the previous set of screens
in their order of occurrence by entering the digits on the
keyboard. Following Conway et al. (2005), we calculated an
accuracy score for this task by comparing their total number
of correctly recalled digits versus the total numbers of counted
digits.
Domain-general context maintenance: dot pattern
expectancy task
Although the previous literature has tended to focus on working
memory as a factor that may modulate an individual’s ability
to process scalar implicatures, two additional processing-related
factors which may be particularly important in processing
some in context are domain-general context-maintenance ability
and attentional control. Domain-general context maintenance
involves holding prior information in working memory and
utilizing it to subsequently determine task-relevant responses
(Cohen et al., 1999). This ability has been examined as a
potentially important source of variability in studies on the
influence of context on ambiguity resolution in language tasks
(e.g., Cohen et al., 1999, lexical ambiguity; Boudewyn et al.,
2015, referential ambiguity). The ability is arguably also relevant
when processing some under different QUDs, which involves
maintaining the prior cues to the QUD and using them to
determine whether an upper-bound or lower-bound meaning is
supported under the current context. Therefore, distinguishing
between QUDs and utilizing them in the interpretation of some
sentences may require sufficient context maintenance ability.
The current study assessed domain-general context
maintenance ability via the Dot Pattern Expectancy Task
(DPX), a version of the Continuous Performance Test in which
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participants respond to visually presented cue-target pairs, and
must make a designated response only when both the cue and the
target come in a specified form (Rosvold et al., 1956; Cohen et al.,
1999). In the DPX, each trial includes a pair of dot patterns, with
a “cue” pattern in white and a “probe” pattern in blue. The trials
were comprised of four types: AX, AY, BX, and BY. AX trials
are the target trials, while all other types are non-targets in that
they either include a non-target probe pattern (AY), or include a
non-target cue pattern followed by a target or non-target probe
pattern (BX and BY, respectively). Therefore, the identity of the
cue determines whether the following probe constitutes a target
trial, as a non-target cue directly indicates a non-target trial
regardless of the identity of the probe. For an individual with
a high level of context maintenance ability, they should be able
to not only correctly recognize the target pattern for AX trials,
but also correctly detect the non-target cue (context) and refrain
from making a target response for BX trials despite the target
probe. In contrast, an individual with lower context maintenance
ability should make more errors in BX trials by ignoring the
context and incorrectly making a target response only based on
the probe.
When completing this task, participants were instructed to
press either a “no” or a “yes” button on a keyboard upon
seeing each dot pattern; they should only press “yes” after seeing
the target blue pattern following the target white pattern, and
press “no” for all the other patterns. After each key press, they
heard either a “bing” or a “buzz” sound indicating whether
they had pressed the correct key. Four practice sessions were
administered at the beginning of the task along with instructions.
Participants practiced until they had reached 80% accuracy
and had responded correctly to at least 1 BX trial, before
they began the main session. The task was administered using
Paradigm (Tagliaferri, 2005), with a cue duration of 1000 ms, an
interstimulus interval of 2000 ms, target presentation for 500 ms,
a response window of 1500 ms, and an intertrial interval of
1200 ms. There were 144 trials in total (104 AX, 16 AY, 16 BX, and
8 BY), with each trial type evenly distributed across four blocks.
A d-prime score was computed for the DPX task, following
Cohen et al. (1999). The d-prime indexes the sensitivity to context
in this task, which accounts for accuracy including both hit rate
on target trials (AX trials) and false-alarms (BX trials, which
included non-target cue pattern followed by a target). For each
participant, their d-prime was calculated by z(the accuracy on
AX trials) − z(the error rate on BX trials). Following standard
procedure, hit rates of 1 were corrected to (1 − 1/160), and false
alarm rates of 0 were corrected to 1/16. Higher d-prime scores
represent greater sensitivity to domain-general context cues.
Attentional control: number Stroop task
Attentional control involves the ability to attend to crucial
information in the presence of distractions and to inhibit the
information that is irrelevant to the current task (e.g., Kane
and Engle, 2002). Higher levels of attentional control ability
have been found to facilitate performance in cognitive and
language tasks involving selective attention and suppression
of irrelevant information (e.g., Hutchison, 2007; Bialystok and
Martin, 2004; Boudewyn et al., 2012; Abutalebi and Green, 2016).
In the literature on scalar implicature, a handful of studies have
included measures of attentional control or inhibition ability as a
submeasure of cognitive resources involved in interpreting some
in isolation, although they have not commonly found it to have
a significant effect (e.g., Heyman and Schaeken, 2015; Antoniou
et al., 2016). We included an attentional control measure in
the current study since sufficient attentional control may be
important for generating QUD-dependent interpretations for
some in context, where the comprehender needs to suppress one
interpretation and pursue the other one that is relevant under
the current QUD, while processing a relatively large amount of
linguistic and visual material compared to a typical study on some
in isolation.
We assessed attentional control via the number Stroop task,
following the procedure outlined in Bush et al. (2006). In each
trial, the participant was asked to count the number of words
presented on the computer screen, which could be any number
between 1 and 4, and to press the corresponding number key as
quickly and as accurately as possible on a button pad. Trials were
presented in 8 blocks of 20 trials; 4 blocks included congruent
trials and 4 included incongruent trials, the order of which was
counterbalanced across blocks. In congruent trials, the words
were common animal words (e.g., “dog dog”; correct response
is 2), while in incongruent trials the words were number words
that do not match with the quantity of words on the screen (e.g.,
“one one one”; correct response is 3). Thus, for incongruent trials,
participants must maintain their attention toward the quantity
of words on the screen while avoiding distraction from the
meanings of the words, in order to achieve the correct answer.
We computed a Stroop interference score for each participant
by subtracting the percent accuracy for congruent trials from
that of incongruent trials, such that higher values reflect better
attentional control ability2.
Personality-Based Socio-Pragmatic Abilities
A number of studies have suggested that individual variation in
the derivation of scalar implicature has its origin in personality
traits (Nieuwland et al., 2010; Katsos and Bishop, 2011; Feeney
and Bonnefon, 2013). As Antoniou et al. (2016) speculate,
personality-based factors such as sensitivity to the pragmatic use
of language in everyday life may be particularly important when
processing language in more conversational settings, as opposed
to when interpreting some sentences outside of any discourse.
Thus, an individual’s ability to utilize QUD in order to arrive at
a pragmatically felicitous interpretation of some in context in the
current study may depend at least in part on their sensitivity to
the pragmatic use of language in everyday life (which we refer to
below as their socio-pragmatic abilities).
In the current study, socio-pragmatic abilities were assessed
via Autism-Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (AQ, Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001), which assesses individuals’ general social and
communicative skills based on the level of autistic-like traits
that their responses demonstrate. The questionnaire includes
2We also computed Stroop interference scores based on reaction time (by
subtracting the reaction time of incongruent trials from congruent trials); since
this score was correlated with the accuracy-based interference score (r = 0.316),
only the accuracy-based interference score is used in the analysis.
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50 statements about self-perceived characteristics, with 10
statements from each of the five subscales examining traits
that vary across the autism spectrum (social skills, attention
switch, communication, attention to detail, and imagination).
Participants were asked to read each statement and answer to
what degree each statement truly reflects themselves, by choosing
from four levels: definitely agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree,
or definitely disagree. Following Baron-Cohen et al. (2001),
the answers were scored by assigning 1 to “definitely agree”
or “slightly agree,” and 0 to “definitely disagree” or “slightly
disagree” for the statements that indicate strong autistic traits,
and assigning 0 to “definitely agree” or “slightly agree,” and 1
to “definitely disagree” or “slightly disagree” for the statements
that do not indicate strong autistic traits. The total score and the
scores for each of the five subscales were calculated by adding up
the scores for the corresponding items. Thus, higher AQ scores
are taken to reflect weaker socio-pragmatic abilities.
Language Skills
A third source of variation that may modulate an individual’s
derivation of scalar implicatures is language skills. Although
native speakers have been assumed to share a native grammar and
thus have similar language abilities, recent studies have revealed
that adult monolingual native speakers do show variability in
native language processing (e.g., Kemper and Sumner, 2001;
Pakulak and Neville, 2010; Borovsky et al., 2012; Dąbrowska,
2012; Van Dyke et al., 2014). Language skills have been shown
to play an independent role in accounting for variability in
native language processing in a range of domains, even when
examined together with assessments of non-linguistic cognitive
resources such as working memory (Van Dyke et al., 2014), which
recommends the inclusion of language skills in studies examining
individual variation in studies on language comprehension.
The measures of language skills in the current study targeted
vocabulary, assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
4th edition (PPVT-4, Dunn and Dunn, 2007), and exposure to
print materials, assessed by Author and Magazine Recognition
task (Acheson et al., 2008). Vocabulary skills have been shown
to predict comprehension success at the word level and the
sentence level (e.g., Braze et al., 2007; Perfetti, 2007; Boudewyn,
2015). It has been argued that having strong, detailed lexical
representations leads to efficient and successful comprehension
in a number of ways, such as by reducing interference between
lexical representations during comprehension (see e.g., Van Dyke
et al., 2014 for recent evidence). It has also been suggested that
that those with stronger lexical representations may be better
able to process the meanings of words and integrate words in
context in order to derive meanings and generate inferences
during passage comprehension (see e.g., Hamilton et al., 2013).
When interpreting some in context, those with better vocabulary
skills may be better able to recognize the two possible readings of
some and to select an optimal reading according to the current
context.
Print exposure has been shown to account for individual
differences in performance across several linguistic domains,
ranging from orthographic and phonological processing through
sentence and discourse comprehension (Acheson et al., 2008;
Arnold et al., 2018). It has been argued that increased print
exposure may lead to increased sensitivity to linguistic cues
that facilitate comprehension, including as regards the resolution
of ambiguity in discourse (e.g., Arnold et al., 2018). Arnold
et al. (2018) found that individuals with greater print exposure
as assessed by the Author and Magazine Recognition Task
were better at resolving ambiguous pronoun reference using
discourse cues. Increased sensitivity to discourse cues and
patterns as a result of greater print exposure may also impact the
interpretation of some in context; individuals with greater print
exposure may be better able to recognize and utilize QUD in
order to arrive at a coherent interpretation of the ambiguous term
some in the discourse.
Vocabulary: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
The PPVT-4 is a standardized test of receptive vocabulary that
spans several subject fields. In each trial, the participant heard
an English word pronounced by an experimenter and was asked
to select from among four pictures the one that corresponds to
the word. The trials were numbered and organized into sets of
12, with increasing level of difficulty. A starting set was initially
picked based on the participant’s chronological age, following the
PPVT-4 manual. If the participant made 2 or more errors in
this set, then the experimenter would go back to the previous
set and test that as the new starting set, until the participant
made 1 or 0 errors in a set. As they responded to the trials,
the participant’s answers were manually recorded and the total
number of errors within each set was tracked by the experimenter
on the PPVT-4 testing booklet. The task came to an end either
when the participant made 8 or more errors within a set, or
when they have completed the last set of the entire test. For each
participant, a raw score was first computed by subtracting the
total number of errors from the number of completed items;
this raw score was then standardized based on the participant’s
chronological age, using the standardization chart provided in the
PPVT-4 manual.
Exposure to print materials: Author and Magazine
Recognition Task
We measured exposure to print materials via the Author and
Magazine Recognition Task (ART and MRT, Acheson et al.,
2008). The ART consists of a list of 130 author names and the
MRT a list of 130 magazine titles. Half of the names in the ART
are real authors’ names and the other half are foils that look
like author names; similarly, half the titles in the MRT are real
magazine titles and the other half are foils that appear to be
magazine titles. The real items in both tasks are from popular
reading materials covering various topics and genres. Participants
were asked to select real authors’ names in the ART and real
magazine titles in the MRT without guessing, by entering an “X”
beside the items in an Excel spreadsheet. Following Acheson et al.
(2008), answers were scored by assigning 1 point for a correctly
identified real item, and −1 point for a foil item incorrectly
identified as real, generating a total score for the ART and for the
MRT for each participant. The ART and MRT scores were then
averaged into one single score, with higher values reflecting more
extensive print exposure.
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Composite Scores for Measures of
Individual Differences
We computed composite scores for cognitive resources and
for language skills, based on the conceptual relatedness of
the specific measures and the correlations among the scores
within each domain (see Supplementary Table S2, for summary
statistics for each of the individual difference measures, and
Supplementary Table S3 for pairwise correlations between the
measures). That is, the composite score for Cognitive Resources
was calculated by summing the Count Span score, Dot-pattern
Expectancy d-prime score, and Stroop interference score. The
Language Skills composite was calculated by summing the
standardized PPVT-4 score and the Author and Magazine
Recognition task score. Total AQ score was used to quantify
individuals’ Socio-pragmatic Abilities. We used Total AQ
rather than the AQ-Communication Subscale (used, e.g., in
Nieuwland et al., 2010), since all the subscale scores strongly
correlated with the total AQ score. However, we note that
the pattern of results reported below does not change if
the AQ-Comm score rather than Total AQ is used in the
analysis. This generates three individual difference scores that
were included as predictors in the model-fitting: Cognitive
Resources, Socio-pragmatic Abilities (Total AQ score), and
Language Skills3. Before model fitting, the three scores were
standardized using z-transformation, so that they are on similar
numerical scales as required by mixed effect models (Jaeger,
2008).
Procedure
Participants completed all the experimental tasks in the
Neurolinguistics and Language Processing Laboratory at the
University of Kansas. Tasks were administered in the following
order, with break times in between each task: Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test 4th edition, Autism-Spectrum Quotient
questionnaire, Author and Magazine Recognition Task, the
Story-sentence Matching Task, Count Span task, Dot Pattern
Expectancy task, and Number Stroop task. The entire session
took about 1 h 30 min to complete in one visit to the laboratory.
Summary of Predictions
Our first research question concerns the extent to which
participants are sensitive to QUD in interpreting some. If
participants are able to utilize QUD in interpreting some,
then a main effect of QUD is expected to emerge, such
that the ratings for the target sentences should be lower
in the all condition than those in the any condition. Our
second research question concerns the role of individual
differences in the context-sensitive interpretation of some. If
the interpretation of some in context is impacted by individual
differences in both Cognitive Resources and Socio-pragmatic
Abilities, then we expect interactions to emerge between QUD
and the Cognitive Resources composite measure, as well as
between QUD and the Socio-pragmatic Abilities measure.
3We note that the composite score for Cognitive Resources, the composite score
for Language Skills, and the Socio-Pragmatic Abilities score are not correlated (see
Supplementary Table S4 for pairwise correlations between the composite scores).
If individual differences in Language Skills also impact the
interpretation of some in context, an interaction between QUD
and the Language Skills composite measure is expected to
emerge.
RESULTS
Data Pre-processing and Modeling
The ratings in the main experiment were statistically analyzed by
fitting a cumulative link mixed model (the clmm function from
the package ordinal) with a probit link function (Christensen,
2010) in the R programming environment. We chose to use
the cumulative link mixed model as it can analyze categorical
outcomes while incorporating subject-level and item-level
random effect structures, which is an advantage over traditional
regression models (Jaeger, 2008; Cunnings, 2012). The probit link
function allows us to analyze rating responses by underlyingly
modeling the log-transformed odds ratio of increasing the rating
by 1 on the Likert scale (e.g., rating an utterance as 5 over 4, or as
6 over 5, etc., on the 7-point scale).
Model fitting began by including the following predictors
of interest: the fixed factors QUD (all, any), and interactions
between QUD and each of the individual difference scores:
QUD × Cognitive Resources, QUD × Socio-pragmatic Abilities,
and QUD × Language Skills. Participant and Item were included
as random intercepts. The initial model was then optimized
by backward-fitting via log-likelihood ratio tests: if removing
a predictor from the initial model did not reduce the model
fit, then a simpler model without that predictor was built;
on the contrary, if removing a predictor led to worse fit,
then the predictor was retained. Following this procedure,
the final model included the fixed effect of QUD and two
interaction terms: QUD × Cognitive Resources, QUD × Socio-
pragmatic Abilities, as well as Participant and Item as random
intercepts.
Effects of QUD and Individual Difference
Measures
The two main research questions in the current study concern
whether QUD modulates the rating of some sentences, which
should be reflected by lower ratings in the all condition
than in the any condition, and to what extent sensitivity to
QUD is subject to individual differences in cognitive resources,
personality-based pragmatic abilities, and language abilities,
which would be reflected in a significant interaction between the
QUD and a given measure of individual differences. Although
all the variables of interest for both research questions were
incorporated into one model, we report the results separately for
each research question below.
A few things should be kept in mind when interpreting the
effects in the final model, which is summarized in Table 1.
Because of the probit link function, the coefficients represent the
effect of predictors on the odds ratio of increasing the ratings,
not directly on the ratings per se. Regarding the QUD effect, as
the all condition was dummy-coded as the baseline condition,
the effect of QUD appeared as the effect of the any condition,
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TABLE 1 | Summary of the final model analyzing N = 64 participants’ ratings as a
function of QUD and individual difference measures.
β SE z p
QUD 0.5963 0.0487 12.25 <0.001
QUD × Cognitive Resources 0.13935 0.04896 2.846 <0.01
QUD × Socio-pragmatic Abilities −0.19605 0.04774 −4.107 <0.001
QUD reflects the difference between the ratings in the any condition compared to
the all condition, which is coded as the baseline.
as compared to the all condition. Finally, since the individual
difference scores have been standardized to fit in the same model,
the effects involving these scores should be interpreted based on
standardized units.
To address the role of QUD, we examined the main effect
of QUD in the model. The main effect of QUD is indeed
significant, indicating that overall participants were more likely to
provide higher ratings for target utterances in the any condition
compared to the all condition (β = 0.5963, SE = 0.0487, z = 12.25,
p < 0.001). In short, this finding suggests that the derivation
of the scalar implicature for some was affected by the QUD
as established in the discourse context (see Supplementary
Figure S1 for a visualization of the differences in mean raw
ratings between the all condition and the any condition). To
confirm that this effect of QUD does not just reflect an overall
preference for the any versus the all stimuli regardless of whether
the stimuli contained some (the targets, where QUD matters) or
only some (the fillers, where QUD does not matter), we examined
responses to the fillers, which also had all versus any QUDs but
had a target sentence with only some, where ratings should not be
sensitive to QUD. As expected, QUD did not modulate ratings in
the fillers (β = 0.1334, SE = 0.8479, z = 0.157, p = 0.875).
To address whether sensitivity to QUD in interpreting some
is impacted by individual differences in cognitive resources,
personality-based pragmatic abilities, and language skills, we
examined interactions between the QUD effect and individual
difference scores in each of these three domains. Among the
individual difference measures, QUD significantly interacted
with both Cognitive Resources (β = 0.1394, SE = 0.0489,
z = 2.846, p < 0.05) and Socio-pragmatic Abilities (β = −0.1961,
SE = 0.0477, z = −4.11, p < 0.001), indicating that the QUD
effect is modulated by individual differences in both domains.
Sensitivity to QUD increased with greater cognitive resources,
and with better socio-pragmatic abilities (note that since better
socio-pragmatic abilities are indexed by lower AQ scores, the
coefficient for the interaction term QUD x Socio-pragmatic
Abilities is negative). Regarding the role of Language Skills,
the fact that QUD × Language Skills was excluded during the
model fitting indicated that Language Skills was not a significant
predictor of individual sensitivity to QUD in our study.
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated the interpretation of the scalar
quantifier some in contexts which establish the not all scalar
implicature as relevant (upper-bound contexts) or irrelevant
(lower-bound contexts). We examined to what extent native
speakers are sensitive to context in interpreting some and which
individual differences may best account for variability across
individuals in the ability to utilize contextual information to
interpret some. Overall, we found that native speakers as a group
do distinguish the meaning of some based on the QUD, such that
the not all implicature is more likely to arise under an upper-
bound QUD than a lower-bound QUD. While the interpretation
of some is typically described as context-sensitive in linguistic
analyses, the findings of the current study converge with those
of a still relatively limited number of experimental studies in
demonstrating sensitivity to QUD in the interpretation of some
during language comprehension (Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino,
2013; Degen and Goodman, 2014; Dupuy et al., 2016; Politzer-
Ahles and Husband, 2018). However, the findings of the current
study also revealed individual differences in the extent to which
QUD affects the interpretation of some, which depended both on
an individual’s cognitive resources and on their personality-based
pragmatic abilities. While previous studies on the processing of
some in isolation have alternatively argued that the derivation
of scalar implicatures depends on cognitive resources or on
personality traits, our findings are unique in demonstrating that
the derivation of scalar implicatures, when tested in a discourse
context, indeed makes recourse to both types of abilities.
The Role of Cognitive Resources in
Context Sensitivity
Our finding that individuals with greater cognitive resources
show greater sensitivity to the context in interpreting some, as
evidenced by the significant interaction of QUD × Cognitive
Resources, converges with the those of a number of studies
arguing that sufficient cognitive resources are required for an
individual to derive scalar implicatures (e.g., De Neys and
Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty and Chemla,
2013). In our study, there are a number of possible ways
that greater cognitive resources may have led to increased
sensitivity to QUD. The interpretation of some with respect to
a given QUD requires successfully attending to the contextual
cues that establish QUD, as well as the encoding and
maintenance of that information throughout the discourse.
Upon encountering some, previously encountered information
needs to be recalled and utilized to compute a context-
sensitive interpretation for some, and the selected meaning
for some must be maintained while possibly inhibiting the
other meaning. All of these processes would arguably make
recourse to the kinds of cognitive resources assessed in the
current study (working memory, attentional control, and ability
to maintain contextual information during processing), which
regard an individual’s ability to encode and maintain information
and direct attention while also processing bottom-up input.
Individuals with greater cognitive resources may also be better
at consistently attending to and utilizing contextual information
in order to interpret the target utterances over the course of an
experiment that involved a relatively large number of target and
filler trials, which itself may incur some amount of processing
burden.
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The Role of Personality-Based Factors in
Context Sensitivity
The current study also revealed that personality-based factors
such as socio-pragmatic abilities (as measured by the AQ)
also modulated sensitivity to QUD; those with greater socio-
pragmatic abilities made a larger distinction between QUDs in
their ratings, thus lending support to accounts arguing that
personality traits modulate an individual’s likelihood of deriving
scalar implicatures (e.g., Nieuwland et al., 2010; Feeney and
Bonnefon, 2013). In the current study, those individuals with
greater awareness of the pragmatic aspects of communication
in daily life, as assessed by AQ, were more sensitive to whether
the not all implicature for some had been established as relevant
within the conversational context.
Our findings converge with a number of previous studies
demonstrating relationships between scalar implicature
derivation and cognitive resources on one hand, and with a
number of studies demonstrating relationships between scalar
implicature derivation and personality traits on the other
hand. Interestingly, in one previous study on the derivation of
scalar implicature for some in isolation which did assess both
potential sources, personality-based factors were not found to
be a significant predictor of realizing the not all implicature
(Antoniou et al., 2016). Recall that Antoniou et al. (2016)
examined the interpretation of some without discourse context,
where the acceptability of some sentences should only depend on
a visual depiction that either made them felicitous or infelicitous.
As Antoniou et al. (2016) acknowledged, socio-pragmatic
abilities may not robustly modulate the interpretation of some in
this type of task as it does not establish any kind of conversational
exchange or discourse involving more than one interlocutor,
and thus may not prompt the participant to make use of their
understanding of the pragmatics of conversation in deciding
how to interpret some.
The fact that Antoniou et al. (2016) did not observe an effect
of personality-based pragmatic abilities while the current study
did find such an effect is consistent with the claim that these
abilities may be particularly important for taking contextual
information into account when interpreting some, in particular
that from communicative discourse contexts. This is exactly the
kind of context provided in our story-sentence matching task,
where a conversation between two interlocutors established the
QUD determining the relevance of the implicature. Our findings
thus strongly argue that individuals rely on both types of ability
in the interpretation of some under conversational discourse
contexts.
The Role of Language Skills
Among our individual difference measures, language skills
(measured via a composite of vocabulary size and exposure to
print materials) did not prove to modulate individual sensitivity
to QUD in interpreting some. It is worth noting that in Antoniou
et al. (2016), their measure of verbal IQ (a sentence repetition
task) also did not significantly predict individuals’ derivation of
the not all implicature. Although neither the current study nor
Antoniou et al. (2016) found evidence of a relationship between
language skills and implicature derivation for some, a question
to be examined in future research is whether language skills
may become increasingly important when the relevance of the
implicature is established in more linguistically rich contexts,
perhaps with less visual information, which may place greater
demands on the comprehender to construct and process the
discourse through careful comprehension of a larger amount of
text or speech input. Future studies could also examine whether
different measures of language abilities might better account for
individual variability in the derivation of scalar implicatures in
context, such as passage comprehension measures which more
directly target the processing of discourse.
More broadly, it may also be interesting for future research
to examine to what extent language skills as well as cognitive
resources and personality-based factors may influence the
derivation of implicatures for scalar terms other than the
quantifier some. Moreover, future research examining individual
differences in sensitivity to context in the interpretation of
scalar terms using online measures such as self-paced reading
(e.g., Breheny et al., 2006; Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino,
2013), eye-tracking (e.g., Politzer-Ahles and Husband, 2018), or
neurolinguistic methods (e.g., Hartshorne et al., 2015; Politzer-
Ahles and Gwilliams, 2015), may also provide new insights
regarding how individual differences in the domains examined
in the current study impact the derivation of scalar implicatures
during the dynamics of language processing.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that comprehenders vary in their ability
to utilize context cues in interpreting some in context. Moreover,
this variability is associated with individual differences in both
cognitive resources and personality-based pragmatic abilities.
While previous studies on the processing of some without
manipulating context have argued for one or the other of these
sources in order to account for individual variability in deriving
scalar implicatures, the current study establishes for the first
time that computing pragmatically enriched meanings based
on the broader discourse indeed draws upon both kinds of
skills.
ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Human Research Protection Program
(HRPP) at the University of Kansas. The protocol was approved
by the Institutional Research Board at the University of Kansas
(Study #00004409). All subjects gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
DATA AVAILABILITY
The de-identified raw data supporting the conclusion of this
manuscript will be made available by the authors, without undue
reservation, to any qualified researcher upon written request.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1720
fpsyg-09-01720 September 18, 2018 Time: 16:50 # 13
Yang et al. Individual Differences in Scalar Implicature
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
XY, UM, and RF contributed the conception and design of the
study. XY administered the experiment, organized the data, and
performed the statistical analyses. XY, UM, and RF contributed to
manuscript writing and editing.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to Dr. Alison Gabriele and Dr. Steven Politzer-
Ahles for their helpful discussion and feedback regarding
this project, and to our research assistant Vann Hassell for
help with data collection. We are also thankful to Jonah
Bates, Dr. Kate Coughlin, John-Patrick Doherty, Dr. Andrew
McKenzie, Dr. Annie Tremblay, and Dr. Jie Zhang for
their help with recruiting participants, and the members
of Research in Acquisition and Processing Seminar at the
University of Kansas and the audience at the 30th CUNY
Conference on Human Sentence Processing for their constructive
feedback.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.
2018.01720/full#supplementary-material
REFERENCES
Abutalebi, J., and Green, D. (2016). Neuroimaging of language control
in bilinguals: neural adaptation and reserve. Bilingualism 19, 689–698.
doi: 10.1017/S1366728916000225
Acheson, D. J., Wells, J. B., and MacDonald, M. C. (2008). New and updated tests
of print exposure and reading abilities in college students. Behav. Res. Methods
40, 278–289. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.1.278
Antoniou, K., Cummins, C., and Katsos, N. (2016). Why only some adults reject
under-informative utterances. J. Pragmatics 99, 78–95. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.
2016.05.001
Arnold, J. E., Strangmann, I. M., Hwang, H., Zerkle, S., and Nappa, R. (2018).
Linguistic experience affects pronoun interpretation. J. Mem. Lang. 102, 41–54.
doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2018.05.002
Barbet, C., and Thierry, G. (2016). Some alternatives? Event-related potential
investigation of literal and pragmatic interpretations of some presented in
isolation. Front. Psychol. 7:1479. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01479
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., and Clubley, E.
(2001). The autism-spectrum quotient (AQ): evidence from Asperger
syndrome/high-functioning autism, males and females, scientists and
mathematicians. J. Autism. Dev. Disord. 31, 5–17. doi: 10.1023/A:10056534
11471
Bialystok, E., and Martin, M. M. (2004). Attention and inhibition in bilingual
children: evidence from the dimensional change card sort task. Dev. Sci. 7,
325–339. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00351.x
Borovsky, A., Elman, J. L., and Fernald, A. (2012). Knowing a lot for one’s age:
vocabulary skill and not age is associated with anticipatory incremental sentence
interpretation in children and adults. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 112, 417–436.
doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2012.01.005
Bott, L., and Noveck, I. A. (2004). Some utterances are underinformative: the
onset and time course of scalar inferences. J. Mem. Lang. 51, 437–457.
doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2004.05.006
Boudewyn, M. A. (2015). Individual differences in language processing:
electrophysiological approaches. Lang. Linguistics Comp. 9, 406–419.
doi: 10.1111/lnc3.12167
Boudewyn, M. A., Long, D. L., and Swaab, T. Y. (2012). Cognitive control
influences the use of meaning relations during spoken sentence comprehension.
Neuropsychologia 50, 2659–2668. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.07.019
Boudewyn, M. A., Long, D. L., Traxler, M. J., Lesh, T. A., Dave, S., Mangun,
G. R., et al. (2015). Sensitivity to referential ambiguity in discourse: the role of
attention, working memory, and verbal ability. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 27, 2309–2323.
doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00837
Braze, D., Tabor, W., Shankweiler, D. P., and Mencl, W. E. (2007). Speaking up
for vocabulary: reading skill differences in young adults. J. Learn. Disabil. 40,
226–243. doi: 10.1177/00222194070400030401
Breheny, R., Katsos, N., and Williams, J. (2006). Are generalised scalar implicatures
generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role of context
in generating pragmatic inferences. Cognition 100, 434–463. doi: 10.1016/j.
cognition.2005.07.003
Bush, G., Whalen, P. J., Shin, L. M., and Rauch, S. L. (2006). The counting Stroop: a
cognitive interference task. Nat. Protoc. 1, 230–233. doi: 10.1038/nprot.2006.35
Chierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the
syntax/pragmatics interface. Struct. Beyond 3, 39–103.
Chierchia, G., Fox, D., and Spector, B. (2012). “Scalar implicature as a grammatical
phenomenon,” in Semantics: An international handbook of natural language
meaning, Vol. 3, eds K. von Heusinger, C. Maienborn, and P. Portner (Berlin:
Mouton de Gruyter), 2297–2331.
Christensen, R. H. B. (2010). Ordinal - regression models for ordinal data. R package
version, 22.
Cohen, J. D., Barch, D. M., Carter, C., and Servan-Schreiber, D. (1999).
Context-processing deficits in schizophrenia: converging evidence from
three theoretically motivated cognitive tasks. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 108:120.
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.108.1.120
Conway, A. R., Kane, M. J., Bunting, M. F., Hambrick, D. Z., Wilhelm, O., and
Engle, R. W. (2005). Working memory span tasks: a methodological review and
user’s guide. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12, 769–786. doi: 10.3758/BF03196772
Cunnings, I. (2012). An overview of mixed-effects statistical models for
second language researchers. Second Lang. Res. 28, 369–382. doi: 10.1177/
0267658312443651
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